21.11.2002, Klimova S.
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In the course of debates over the prospects and terms for the restoration of peaceful life in Chechnya, the figure of Aslan Maskhadov has popped up again in political statements and media reports_new. The Russian president unambiguously rejected any possibility of negotiations with Maskhadov, first because Maskhadov supported international terrorism, and second because he doesn't have authority among the Chechen militants and population. In order to understand whether Russians agree with Putin's stand on Maskhadov and, if so, the grounds for this agreement – the unquestionable authority of the Russian leader or the coincidence of his statement with people's own appraisals - a poll was conducted to identify the opinion of ordinary citizens and experts on this issue.
As it turned out, the name of Aslan Maskhadov is known to more than 90% of Russians. The overwhelming majority of those polled – 71% - feel bad, and 14% are indifferent to him. Only a few individuals (1% of those surveyed) reported a good attitude on Maskhadov. The same divisions can be also found in the experts' responses.
Residents of the Southern Federal District, more than other regions suffering in the neighborhood of the rebellious republic, are more likely than average to feel bad about Maskhadov (80%). In the Urals and the Northwestern Districts, attitudes on him are more indifferent (20% and 22%, respectively).
To figure how Russians feel about the former president of Chechnya, let us see the responses to the open-ended question, the findings of the focus group discussions and interviews with the experts.
About half of all responses to the open-ended question, «What do you know about Aslan Maskhadov?» contain negative appraisals. One-fifth of those interviewed see him as a terrorist. Another 15% called Maskhadov a gangster, and another 10% giving him other negative characteristics («beast, killer,» «enemy of the Chechen and Russian peoples»).
Another half of responses contain neutral characteristics and often refer to his status. Some recall his military past («a former Soviet military officer»), others underline the legitimacy of his presidential status («elected president of Chechnya») and give neutral characteristics to his current role («the commander of the Chechens,» «a citizen of Chechnya»). Only a few attempt to justify him («he defends his Motherland»).
The opinions of the focus group participants are also divided. Debates over his involvement in unleashing the second Chechen war flared up continuously, and every time someone said that media does not report the full truth about Maskhadov.
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Interviewer: What do you know about Aslan Maskhadov?
First female participant: President of Chechnya.
Second participant: A former colonel of the Soviet Armed Forces, now the leader of gangsters.
Third female participant: I heard Sazhi Umalatova, she gave him the best references. She said he's a very cultured man, with a higher education. But what we hear about his is completely different. I don't know the truth.
Fourth female participant: We have no access to the truth. This is suspicious. We now nothing about him.
Fifth participant: He's described as a gangster.
Fourth female participant: A gangster seeking benefits for himself, but he wants a different thing – peace for his own nation" (DFG, Moscow).
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First female participant: A gangster.
Second participant: He is a gangster, but on the other hand, we don't know what's going on in Chechnya... Perhaps he is a national hero, a man defending his rights. But no one will ever figure out whether he is right or wrong.
First female participant: He's a criminal.
Third participant: A terrorist and gangster seeking his own mercenary interests. He doesn't defend the interests of his nation. When they were in power, they killed everyone. There can't be any other point of view.
Fourth female participant: But how did it happen? Why did Russians join the partisans, why didn't they let themselves be defeated by the Germans? I agree with Sergei: he could be a patriot of his nation, but we offended him, our leadership could be wrong and we don't know everything (DFG, St. Petersburg).
As we can see, responses of the focus group participants and those given to the open-ended question contain mixed appraisals of Aslan Maskhadov, from unambiguously negative characteristics to far more cautious evaluations, some of them even voicing compassion for him.
The experts' characteristics of Maskhadov are more comprehensive, but basically negative. He is often blamed for failing to bring order in the republic as president of independent Ichkeria.
- «He is a gangster with a national shade. I used to feel good about him and treated him as a normal Soviet officer. But Caucasian nationalism was obviously developing for ages, especially in Chechnya, and one day it blew up.»
(expert, Vladimir).
- "No constructive changes took place when he was president of Ichkeria"
(expert, Kaliningrad).
Both the experts and rank-and-file citizens, however, refrain from labeling Maskhadov as a criminal. Some statements describe him as a weak politician, a victim of circumstances and the inner circle, rather than a hero or a strong personality.
- «I have a mixed attitude on him. On the one hand, he's an adequate and sensible man. On the other hand, I can't stop thinking that our state drove him into a corner and prevented him from acting as he would have liked to.»
(expert, St. Petersburg).
- «I regard him as an unhappy man who was a mediocre politician and by force of circumstances was placed as the head of the republic that was in a disastrous situation. I somewhat feel pity for him. I think he's not in his proper place. In my view, he is not a decision-maker, because he totally depends on circumstances and the opinions of the others.»
(expert, Krasnoyarsk).
The majority of Russians (67%) are convinced that Maskhadov was involved in the hostage-taking in Moscow, this view being more likely to be held in the Southern Federal District (75%). As little as 5% are inclined to think that Maskhadov had nothing to do with the terrorist action, and 20% found it difficult to answer the question.
The experts are less likely than rank-and-file citizens to charge Maskhadov with being involved in the hostage-taking (two-thirds suppose he did, and about one-seventh presume he didn't). Those feeling skeptical about allegations of Maskhadov's masterminding the terrorist action in Moscow substantiate their point of view as follows:
- «He's no fool and he couldn't help figuring out that given the fuss about terrorism, those he could count on in Europe and the U.S. would immediately turn away from him. He must have been an idiot not to figure it.»
(expert, Krasnodar).
Those holding the opposite view say Maskhadov couldn't help knowing about such a tremendous act.
- «A terrorist act is a large-scale thing for Maskhadov to be ignorant of it. He warned that the world would speak differently soon and the militants themselves admitted having contacted him... Even if the order was given by Basayev, Maskhadov was aware of it, even though he himself may not have personally been involved in masterminding the operation.»
(expert, St. Petersburg).
Negotiating or not negotiating with Maskhadov is not only a matter of interpretation of his personality and his role in the tragedy. First of all we have to find out how popular is the view that negotiations should be held with representatives of the Chechen rebels. Those believing in the necessity of such talks account for 36% of those surveyed. The opposite view is more widespread (45%); 12% find it difficult to voice their stand on this issue. It is noteworthy, however, that university graduates, as people more inclined to analysis and voicing their own opinions, are more likely to favor negotiations. In this group, the idea of negotiations with the Chechen fighters is favored by 50%, and opposed by 42%.
The issue of negotiations with the Chechen side also aroused hot debates at the focus group sessions. Those calling for talks with the Chechen rebels say that losses in the war are too great for both sides involved. Those opposing negotiations provide the following arguments to support their view: the Chechens are not trustworthy; the Khasavyurt peace treaty showed that the rebels see talks as a sign of weakness; the war in Chechnya would be won if it were not a «strange war,» the continuation of which is in the interests of influential forces in Russia.
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First participant: The war must be stopped and we should start negotiations. It would also stop the killing of our boys there.
Second participant: There were talks once. I'm from the south and I know Chechens a little. They can breach all preliminary agreements any time. Negotiations are necessary, perhaps, but with many terms and conditions. First, you can't trust everything they would agree on. And second, our government must protect Russia's interests." (DFG, St. Petersburg).
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First female participant: Talks are necessary. Better to reach peace agreements with anyone.
Second participant: Reaching agreements with Chechens is impossible – they only understand force and money.
Third participant: «I don't think we should start talks with Maskhadov, there is the official leadership anyway. And second, we should seek a more efficient way of fighting them. There is actually a war now, we only send people to death out there.» (DFG, Voronezh).
The experts also indicated the strange nature of the Chechen war.
- «I think oil is involved in it. In Russia and Chechnya alike, there are money-bags interested in the continuation of this war. War provides an excellent opportunity to launder money, plus oil.»
(expert, Penza).
The experts are more likely than ordinary citizens to support the idea of negotiations with the Chechen rebels: three-quarters favor talks and only slightly over one-quarter oppose them.
The opponents of negotiations say that Russia's consent to start talks will be interpreted by the Chechen rebels as a sign of weakness and will only give a chance for militant units to build up their forces.
- «Before Khasavyurt and today, I'm strongly convinced that no talks with the rebels are possible. You should know the Chechen mentality. If the enemy seeks peace, then he's weak. That's why talks are only possible with the people who never held weapons, the elders, mullahs, whatever, but not with the militants. For them any talks are a sign of weakness.»
(expert, Stavropol).
The opponents of negotiations put forward another argument in favor of their view: at the current moment no talks are expedient.
- «If the Russian government started negotiating with them now they would demonstrate disrespect for the people that were treated so horribly in downtown Moscow. This would be a loss of authority within Russia as well. Negotiations will be possible only after the liquidation of the leaders of gangster groups. Then talks with the elders can be started. As long as people are civilians in daytime and fighters at night, this fun will go on.»
(expert, Vladimir).
Another opinion is encountered, according to which all talks are pointless as long as hard-liners in the Kremlin remain influential.
- «Putin is not free in his moves. There is a very strong military-political wing that wouldn't allow him to do so. I can't say for sure, but it is said that this wing is led by General Staff chief Kvashnin.»
(expert, St. Petersburg).
Only a few experts unconditionally support negotiations.
- "Negotiations must be held at any rate. This war has reached a deadlock. Our boys are dying there, but it brings no results at all"
(expert, Barnaul).
The majority of those favoring negotiations say they are possible, but only on certain conditions. First, as they believe, talks must be conducted from a «position of strength.»
- "If Maskhadov recognized his mistake and repented his sins"
(expert, Krasnoyarsk).
- «Only on condition of total surrender. Talks with Chechnya are impossible until the total defeat of the fighters, including Maskhadov. The physical elimination of Basayev is desirable.»
(expert, Krasnodar).
Second condition: talks must be held at the appropriate level.
- «Negotiations are always necessary. Another matter is at what level they are held. We don't need the government level now, at the moment we must talk with envoys and diplomats. Let those talk who don't represent governments, and act only as advisors. Only after they have found a common platform, agree on what can be done and what can't, should they approach the government. You can't start negotiations now when nothing is ready for them.»
(expert, Krasnoyarsk).
And third, the authorities shouldn't drive leaders of the fighters into a corner, and should even offer them assistance in leaving the country.
- «If we want to neutralize Maskhadov, the authorities can meet with him and offer him to leave the country, provided he won't claim leadership in Chechnya. But there is Shamil Basayev, who seeks power as well.»
(expert, Ryazan).
And finally, the fourth condition: the presence of international organizations in the talks.
- «One can't count on Russia and authoritative Russian leaders alone, especially if we don't have them. There must be an internationally acclaimed authority.»
(expert, Kaliningrad).
However, the proponents of talks are divided on whether Maskhadov should represent the Chechen side in these talks. Neither ordinary people nor the experts agree on this point. 17% of those interviewed suppose that negotiations must be held with Maskhadov, and 42% say the Chechen side must be represented by a different figure. The opinion that Maskhadov is an acceptable figure for talks is more likely to be held by those aged 18-35 (22%).
Remarkably, one-third of those interviewed (34%) found it difficult to answer this question. This implies that by agreeing in general with Putin's statement that there must be no talks with Maskhadov, many Russians still poorly understand who must represent the Chechens in those talks, and whether Maskhadov can be ruled out of this dialog.
To answer this question, we made an attempt to establish if any connection exists between an inclination for negotiations with the Chechen side and recognition of Maskhadov as an eligible partner at such negotiations.
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All respondents |
Russian authorities should negotiate with representatives of the opposing side in Chechnya ... |
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yes |
no |
hard to answer |
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Groups (%) |
100 |
36 |
45 |
12 |
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Question: If Russian authorities decided to start negotiations with the opposing side in Chechnya, do you think they should negotiate with Maskhadov, or someone else?" |
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Aslan Maskhadov |
17 |
30 |
12 |
8 |
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Someone else |
42 |
45 |
49 |
31 |
|
Hard to answer |
34 |
25 |
39 |
61 |
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This table demonstrates that supporters of talks are more likely to find Maskhadov a more acceptable figure to represent the opposing side, while those ruling out any possibility of negotiations suggest finding other candidates for such talks. The above figures indirectly confirm that talk on seeking «other partners for negotiations» can be regarded in public opinion as an actual rejection of any talks at all.
The same question was given to the experts. As it turned out, their answers are no more confident than those given by rank-and-file citizens. Those inclined to seek a different figure for negotiations don't reach one-half of the interviewed experts, while almost one-third are more inclined to accept Maskhadov as an eligible negotiator. Moreover, the place of «another negotiator» is actually vacant. Assessing the influence of certain political leaders on the Chechen population, some experts named Kadyrov, and others mention Khasbulatov, yet all the experts agreed that Maskhadov enjoys some support from the militants and civilians in Chechnya.
In refusing to negotiate with Maskhadov, the Russian authorities state, in particular, that he can't control the situation and any talks with him are pointless. Our data demonstrate that only a small number of Russians are likely to share this view. As little as 19% believe that Maskhadov has no authority among the Chechen rebels, while 50% hold the opposite view. This latter view is more likely to be held by socially resourceful population groups: young people (18-35 years of age – 55%), residents of large cities (56%), and in the Central Federal District (56%).
Remarkably, supporters of talks are more likely than their opponents to see Maskhadov as an influential figure.
| |
All respondents |
Russian authorities should negotiate with representatives of the opposing side in Chechnya ... |
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yes |
no |
hard to answer |
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Groups (%) |
100 |
36 |
45 |
12 |
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Question: According to one opinion, Aslan Maskhadov has much authority among Chechen fighters, while according to a different opinion, he has little authority. which of these two views is closest to your own?" |
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First |
50 |
62 |
52 |
36 |
|
Second |
19 |
19 |
25 |
12 |
|
Hard to answer |
23 |
20 |
23 |
52 |
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No response (I don't know who Aslan Maskhadov is) |
8 |
- |
- |
- |
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As for the experts, they are more prone than ordinary citizens to accept the official position stating that Maskhadov has no authority. Yet even they are not unanimous on this point. Around half of the interviewed experts regard Maskhadov as an influential figure, and the other half disagrees. The experts provide arguments in support of each of these appraisals. Remarkably, even experts living in areas neighboring Chechnya are also divided on their appraisals of Maskhadov, referring at the same time to «first-hand accounts» of the situation in Chechnya.
- «Maskhadov doesn't seem to have influence with the fighters. People travelling there say no one is influential in Chechnya today. He may have some influence in some militant groups. But in Chechnya, only the power of money is recognized, Maskhadov or someone else, they don't give a damn. These people have no ideology, even in the bad sense of this word. Their only ideology is money. They're deep in blood, and no return for them is possible, neither to Russia, nor to their own people. Because they killed so many and brought so much sorrow to many people, including Chechen families,, that they can't leave those gangs. They will never come back to a peaceful life.»
(expert, Stavropol).
- «Maskhadov plays a far more important role than the federal government and the Kremlin imagine. It is not true that he has no influence. He does have influence, and a fairly strong one. This is a game, his role is deliberately downplayed. We live in south Russia, I used to travel a lot to Chechnya, and I know – his influence is very strong. Many regard his as a legally elected president. And he is really fighting the federal authorities.»
(expert, Krasnodar).
The idea that the Kremlin is deliberately downplaying Maskhadov's role is often encountered in interviews with the experts. In terms of political tactics, they see this position as reasonable, but stress that a public rejection of talks with the leaders of the militants in general, and Maskhadov in particular, shouldn't completely rule out such talks.
- «If we demonstrated to the Chechen population our readiness to negotiate with Maskhadov, his ratings would reach 30% the next day. That we don't want to talk with him lowers his popularity. Because among the Chechens are people who want to raise children, grow grain and graze cattle. Not all of them are Abreks. The main task for our politicians now is finding a force and through negotiations with it reach peace. We tell our people that no talks with gangsters are possible. This is an attempt to fool us. Today they are bandits and tomorrow they are not. If they were not treated as bandits, half of them would stop being so.»
(expert, St. Petersburg).
The experts stating that Maskhadov has lost his influence to a great extent say that the sufferings of the civilian population in Chechnya are so great that they would be willing to support any leader capable of gaining peace in Chechnya.
- "Ordinary Chechens are unlikely to lay much hope on him."
(expert, Penza).
Those experts who compare the influence of Maskhadov and Kadyrov are more inclined to believe that Maskhadov is the more influential figure, primarily because he is the legally elected president of Chechnya. The fact that his presidential term expired long ago and no elections have since been held is not to be held against him.
- «Maskhadov has more influence in Chechnya than Kadyrov. People elected him. If other elections were held and they voted for a different figure, this would be a different matter. But now they have no other elected leader.»
(expert, Smolensk).
- «Maskhadov is a really the legitimate head of Ichkeria. He's got the halo of a martyr portraying him as the legitimate president who by force of circumstance was removed from office.»
(expert, Krasnoyarsk).
Summarizing the opinions of ordinary citizens and the experts on possible negotiations with Maskhadov or other influential figures in Chechnya shows the most widespread point of view is as follows: the Russian authorities should seek contacts with representatives of the opposing side without ending the anti-terrorist operation. In other words, the Russian leadership shouldn't raise the status of negotiations to the top level, nor they should pick just one Chechen leader with whom to negotiate. The most appropriate move would be a demand for the surrender of arms and capitulation of the armed groups. Favoring the idea of holding a referendum in Chechnya, many find it quite possible for Aslan Maskhadov to act as a negotiator, but insist that he is not to be the only one to represent Chechnya in these talks.
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