FOM: Public Opinion Foundation (Russia)

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06.06.2002, Analysis

Chechen Labyrinth

The majority of Russians have no hope that the situation in Chechnya will normalize in the near future. The percentage of respondents who are pessimistic about it is more than twice as high as the percentage of those who expect the conflict to be resolved soon.

Question: "Do you think Russia will be able to normalize the situation in Chechnya in the near future, or not?"

	November 24-25, 2001	February 16-17, 2002	May 18-19, 2002
Yes	24	22	27
No	56	58	59
Undecided	19	19	14

The increase in the percentage of respondents registered in the last poll is too small to be seen as a symptom of serious changes, especially considering the fact that the percentage of pessimists did not decrease. The people do not appear to believe that the situation in Chechnya will change in the near future or that there are any prospects of its normalization. Now that large-scale military action has been discontinued, a convincing indication of such normalization to "the man on the street" would be only full discontinuation of terrorist acts and subversive activities and attacks at federal troops and posts, and not only in Chechnya, but also in the neighboring territories. However, the majority of the respondents surveyed do not see any reason to expect the situation in Chechnya to fully return to normal. Focus group discussion participants do not appear to have any hope on this score.

"Moderator: Do you think the war in Chechnya is over or not?

Lyudmila Vitalyevna: I think it will never end, they will continue fighting.

Moderator: Does everyone think so? Sasha, what do you think?

Sasha: I agree, the war is not over.

Vasily: People are still being killed.

Igor: The war is probably over, but they are still fighting.

Vladimir Alexandrovich: The war is over, the troops have already been withdrawn from there. Now only individual terrorist acts occur.

Oleg Vasilyevich: I think they will continue fighting for another decade.

Moderator: You think it will last for another ten years. Any other opinions? When will this end?

Vladimir Alexandrovich: I think such a thing can last for even a hundred years.

Larisa: I think it is the permanent state of this region" (DFG, St. Petersburg).

"I think it will never end" (DFG, Moscow).

"There will be some temporary peace, but then everything will begin again" (DFG, Moscow).

"We have stuck there. It's the East, they will continue taking vengeance" (DFG, Voronezh).

"Moderator: Is there a war in Chechnya going on now or not?

Sergei: Yes.

Olga: Yes.

Moderator: Do you think it will last much longer?

Anatoly: Yes.

Svetlana: It will last until the last Chechen dies" (DFG, Voronezh).

However, some group discussion participants believe there are indications of improvements. But even these respondents speak about information indicating positive tendencies with caution and even some mistrust. Therefore, those who are optimistic as a rule are slightly unconfident:

"Katya: It seems like thing are improving there, they are restoring the gas pipeline.

Katya: People are starting to live a normal life.

Sveta: We say what we see, but we don't know how things really are. Therefore, we cannot judge about the situation there.

Katya: The press is telling us that everything is OK there" (DFG, Moscow).

Only 35% of the respondents said they believe media reports_new about Khattab's death, while 42% of those polled said they believe he is still alive. This shows that people in Russia tend to be skeptical about official information about the situation in Chechnya. Even among the respondents who approve the actions by the Russian military in Chechnya (who are more numerous that the respondents with other opinions) the percentage of those who believed the news reports_new (42%) was only slightly higher than that of those who did not believe them (38%). Focus group discussion participants said the information about Khattab's death may not be true, suspecting both rebels and the federals of misinformation.

"Anton: Now it's time to get people to stop talking about Khattab. That's why they took him out.

Yura: They showed him.

Katya: It may be someone who looks very much like him.

Anton: They showed a wounded Basayev. They first showed only a wounded leg and then only his face. They did not show the whole of him.

Katya: It was the same with this man: they first showed a hand without fingers and then the body.

Moderator: Do you think they did it?

Maxim: Nobody knows.

Katya: He is so rich ...

Maxim: There are enough doubles.

Katya: Very many doubles.

Maxim: People in power have always had doubles. Lenin and Brezhnev had doubles, too.

Moderator: So they are deceiving us intentionally?

Katya: Intentionally.

Anton: They have to comfort people somehow" (DFG, Moscow).

"Vladimir Alexandrovich: They first said that Shamil Basayev was killed, then said one should not make hasty conclusions, and yesterday they showed the head of the headquarters and he again said he has to be liquidated. But they said they were sure about Khattab.

Moderator: And what did they say?

Vladimir Alexandrovich: That he has been killed.

Moderator: Do you believe this information?

Vladimir Vladimirovich: Yes, I do.

Oleg Vasilyevich: He may turn up in Paris in a month.

Moderator: Do you think he will emerge again?

Oleg Vasilyevich: Probably yes. Everything is possible in our country» (DFG, St. Petersburg).

It should be noted that the lack of confidence in information about the events taking place in Chechnya and the situation there are largely due to the fact that the people doubt that the Russian authorities genuinely want to end the military operation and to achieve full normalization. Forty percent of the respondents believe the authorities genuinely want it, while 48% of the people have the opposite opinion.

Question: «Some people believe that the Russian authorities are doing everything to normalize the situation in Chechnya. Some people do not agree with this. Which of these viewpoints on this matter is closer to yours?» (The respondents were given cards, on which they were supposed to mark one response).

	Russians in General	Age
	Russians in General	18–35	36–50	over 50
The authorities want and can normalize the situation in Chechnya	10	9	9	12
The authorities want, but cannot normalize the situation in Chechnya	31	31	30	31
The authorities can, but do not want to normalize the situation in Chechnya	37	43	43	29
The authorities do not want and cannot normalize the situation in Chechnya	11	9	12	13
Undecided	10	8	6	14

The information given above is very important for understanding the logic of the way the events taking pace in Chechnya are perceived by the mass consciousness. The percentages of respondents who believe that the authorities are willing and able to solve the problem of Chechnya and of those who believe that they are both unwilling and unable to do it are small are practically the same. The overwhelming majority of the respondents are inclined to believe that the authorities either do not want to are unable to solve the problem. It is interesting that the percentage of the respondents (both young people and middle aged people) who suspect the authorities of not wanting to solve the problem of Chechnya is almost 50% higher than the percentage of these who believe the authorities are unable to do it. Only among elderly people this point of view is less popular than the opposite one, probably because for people, who have lived most of their lives under the Soviets and are used to trusting the state and depending on it, it is more difficult to assume that the authorities are consciously dragging out the conflict on their own territory for some reason.

Judgements on this issue depend largely on the respondents' political views. Zyuganov's supporters are more inclined to accuse the authorities of not wanting to normalize the situation: only 26% of them believe that the authorities «want, but cannot» resolve the problem, while 41% said the authorities «can, but do not want» to do it and 12% of Communist Party supporters believe the authorities cannot and do not want to do it. Unlike them, supporters of Vladimir Putin somewhat more frequently believe that the authorities «want, but cannot» normalize the situation (38%). However, a considerable percentage of those who support Putin believe that the authorities are playing a double game here: 34% of these respondents said the latter «can, but do not want» to normalize the situation (8% said they «cannot and do not want» to do it).

Naturally, the respondents' ideas about the intentions and potential of the Russian authorities to solve the Chechen problem have a considerable impact on their predictions. However, one of three respondents who believe that the authorities both can and want to normalize the situation said it cannot be achieved «in the near future.»

Question: «Do you think Russia will be able to normalize the situation in Chechnya in the near future, or not?»

	Russians in General	The Authorities' Ability and Willingness to Normalize the Situation in Chechnya
	Russians in General	They want and can do it	They want, but cannot do it	They can, but do not want to do it	They cannot and do not want to do it	Undecided
Yes	27	58	35	21	14	14
No	59	32	55	67	77	47
Undecided	14	10	9	13	10	39

The respondents who doubt the authorities' ability to normalize the situation, but not their willingness to do it, are much more optimistic about the prospects of solving the problem of Chechnya than those who believe the authorities do not want to solve the problem, although they can do it. In other words, the former are more inclined to hope that the authorities will take more affective actions to settle the situation in Chechnya than the latter are inclined to hope that the authorities will become willing to do it.

Materials obtained in group discussions to some extent make it possible to make conclusions about the Russia's ideas of the subjective and objective factors preventing normalization of the situation in Chechnya.

Let us first look at the spectrum of interpretative schemes that provide possible reasons why the Russian authorities cannot settle the situation in Chechnya and around it. These reasons include the objective problems that the authorities are facing.

First, focus group participants realize that it is very difficult to fight terrorism, to avert terrorist acts and to find their perpetrators and initiators.

«It took them some half an hour to place something there. It's very difficult to avert a terrorist act» (DFG, Moscow).

Moderator: Do you think the people who organized it [the terrorist act] can be found?

Sveta: I don't think so.

Moderator: Why?

Ira: There are a lot of scapegoats» (DFG, Moscow).

Moderator: Does everyone agree that they are unlikely to be found?

Sergei: They may find the perpetrators, but they will never find the person who ordered it.

Moderator: Why?

Sergei: Because this person is very highly placed and is very far. It may be a very high-ranking official (DFG, Voronezh).

Igor: One needs to live in peace with peaceful Chechens. It is necessary to discern bad Chechens from good Chechens. Even though they have a different psychology, I know that it is possible to get along with them.

Vladimir Alexandrovich: He can be one person during the day, but entirely different in the night (DFG, St. Petersburg).

Second, the respondents mention the Chechen mentality. They constantly refer to the history of this nation, to be exact to their own, very vague ideas about it.

Nobody has ever beaten the Chechens. There is no such a nation. And vengeance will continue until the last Chechen dies. They won't surrender. It's not that kind of nation that can be enslaved (DFG, Voronezh).

Igor: I am sorry Yermolov died one hundred years ago. He then got Chechnya to behave itself.

Moderator: Do you think we need to bring Yermolov back?

Igor: Yes, or a person like him. The Chechens are different psychologically. He knew their psychology and managed to forge a relationship with them. He acted slightly differently (DFG, St. Petersburg).

Maxim: Nothing will go well there, you need to know history. Beginning from Alexander II, when they scattered them all ...

Moderator: They later reached an agreement with Shamil.

Maxim: They did. But how did they do it? They allowed the entire family to live in Kaluga. The tsar provided an allowance for his entire clan, and they reached an agreement. When Shamil died, they started over again. In 1947, when our troops came, they killed soldiers. Then the problem was solved by scattering from Kazakhstan to the North.

Yury: Then it became quiet.

Maxim: Peace was restored. And now they are again in groups and will fight like they did in Afghanistan (DFG, Moscow).

Third, a lot is said about the supposed massive support that Chechen rebels are getting from the outside, from international terrorists or the Islamic world. However, ordinary people do not always make a distraction between these concepts. The respondents who doubt the authorities' ability to normalize the situation, but not their willingness to do it, are much more optimistic about the prospects of solving the problem of Chechnya than those who believe the authorities do not want to solve the problem, although they can do it. In other words, the former are more inclined to hope that the authorities will take more affective actions to settle the situation in Chechnya than the latter are inclined to hope that the authorities will become willing to do it.

Materials obtained in group discussions to some extent make it possible to make conclusions about the Russia's ideas of the subjective and objective factors preventing normalization of the situation in Chechnya.

Let us first look at the spectrum of interpretative schemes that provide possible reasons why the Russian authorities cannot settle the situation in Chechnya and around it. These reasons include the objective problems that the authorities are facing.

First, focus group participants realize that it is very difficult to fight terrorism, to avert terrorist acts and to find their perpetrators and initiators.

«It took them some half an hour to place something there. It's very difficult to avert a terrorist act» (DFG, Moscow).

Moderator: Do you think the people who organized it [the terrorist act] can be found?

Sveta: I don't think so.

Moderator: Why?

Ira: There are a lot of scapegoats» (DFG, Moscow).

Moderator: Does everyone agree that they are unlikely to be found?

Igor: One needs to live in peace with peaceful Chechens. It is necessary to discern bad Chechens from good Chechens. Even though they have a different psychology, I know that it is possible to get along with them.

Nobody has ever beaten the Chechens. There is no such a nation. And vengeance will continue until the last Chechen dies. They won't surrender. It's not that kind of nation that can be enslaved (DFG, Voronezh).

Igor: I am sorry Yermolov died one hundred years ago. He then got Chechnya to behave itself.

Maxim: Nothing will go well there, you need to know history. Beginning from Alexander II, when they scattered them all ...

«Rebels from Turkey and Iran are fighting there. There are people from all sorts of countries» (DFG, Moscow).

«They are not fighting themselves. There are very few Chechens are fighting there» (DFG, Voronezh).

Vladimir Alexandrovich: There are not just Chechens there, they are also getting help from abroad.

Lidiya Ivanovna: There are many mercenaries, they are helping them with technology and everything.

Vladimir Alexandrovich: There are many mercenaries there. It's not just Chechens. The same is happening in the Middle East. Palestine has problems with Israel, Georgia – with Abkhazia, Armenia – with Azerbaijan. These tensions ease and then aggravate again (DFG, St. Petersburg).

One of the participants in the St. Petersburg discussion said that in order to end the war in Chechnya «the leaders have to be destroyed.» In response to the moderator's question as to whether he meant the Chechen leaders he said: «No, the leaders of the world terrorism. Then the situation will be resolved, or at least changed.» Another person said while discussing the Kaspiisk terrorist act that it was carried out by «some Islamists, [...] maybe even Afghanistan.» A third respondents said: «Probably. They are poking their noses everywhere.» And a participant in a focus group discussion in Moscow said referring to the developments in Chechnya that «Islam is spreading in the world.»

Fourth, some focus group discussion participants said the problem of Chechnya cannot be resolved as long as Russia's statehood and economy are weak. However, sometimes this helps respondents to be cautiously optimistic about the future, hoping that the situation in Chechnya will automatically normalize if order is brought in Russia.

Volodya: I think everything will be resolved sometime. In two or three years. Putin has began dealing with it, What first caused the mess? The army is a mess, the police is corrupt, this is what is causing problems. Why could they move without restrictions? It seemed like they were encircled, but they still moved freely from one place to another. Because they paid policemen and military posts and were allowed to move without problems. Putin has now started bringing order in terms of wages, social policy, etc. If he raises the prestige of the country and eliminates corruption, order will come automatically.

Moderator: Who is ready to support Vladimir?

Yura: Yes, but it will take time, 5-10 years.

Volodya: Unfortunately, yes. There has always been power, the army, the police and the KGB. They have upset this balance and it caused a mess (DFG, Moscow).

Oleg Vasilyevich: When Russia gets back to its feet, things will improve there, too. Definitely.

Lyudmila Vasilyevna: America is on its feet, but they still attacked them (DFG, St. Petersburg).

The last remark shows that not all respondents like the inversion logic. As to respondents who tie the developments in Chechnya with the weakness of Russia and at the same time do not hope that its might will be restored anytime soon, they are naturally extremely pessimistic. In a focus group discussion in Moscow, people ended their reminiscences of Stalin's deportation of the Chechens by remarks like these:

Anton: There was a state then, and now ...

Maxim: What's the use of discussing it now? There is no state, there is nothing (DFG, Moscow).

All these interpretative schemes are very widespread. When the situation in Chechnya is discussed in focus groups – and the Public Opinion Foundation addresses this issue on a regular basis – discussion participants always use them to explain why they believe the Russian authorities cannot resolve this situation. Certainly, the «intensity» of their use varies depending on the dynamics of the developments in the Northern Caucasus and on the angle from which they are looked at. But the factors that, in the opinion of the respondents, prevent successful settlement are basically the same. Besides the factors already mentioned, there is a minimum two more factors.

First, discussion participants often say that the catastrophic socio-economic situation in Chechnya constantly provokes instability, because unemployment, lack of social infrastructure and poverty cause the Chechens to take part in rebel groups. This aspect of the problem was not addressed in the recent group discussions, but many Russians surely realize that the socio-economic situation in Chechnya is a serious obstacle to peace. In any case, in response to an open-ended question as to what needs to be done to normalize the situation in the region 3% of the respondents said that it is necessary to solve the socio-economic problems of Chechnya:

«To improve the economic situation in Chechnya, to occupy the people» «to pursue an open policy, to occupy the people, to open hospitals and schools»; «it is necessary to create a normal environment for the people living in Chechnya»; «to improve the economic situation, to end unemployment» (open-ended question).

Second. Participants in focus group discussions held at various stages of the Chechen campaign frequently said that the Russian troops are having a hard time winning the war in Chechnya because the Chechens have a stronger motivation because they are fighting for their national independence. However, this motive is mentioned less frequently now. The somewhat romanticized idea of Chechen rebels, which indicates echoes of almost instinctive admiration of «national liberation movements» inherited from the Soviet era, is gradually dying out. This idea was voiced in only one of the recent focus group discussions:

«Maybe the Chechens are right in their own way ... They have an idea, they are fighting for their Motherland. It is a civil war to them» (DFG, Voronezh).

In the meantime, the idea brought up in one of the focus group discussions has probably never been raised in discussions of obstacles to effective settlement of the Chechen issue. After the discussion participants recalled with clear nostalgia how radically this problem was solved by Stalin (Stalin was always mentioned in discussions on this issue, although the respondents are not so enthusiastic about his method of solving the problem as they are about Yermolov's method), the moderator's question about the possibility and acceptability of new deportation of Chechens provokes the following dialogue:

Sveta: It's not that it's not possible ...

Galya: It's not realistic.

Anton: The thing is that almost all of them are living in Russia now.

Sveta: There are so many Chechens in Moscow! We have more of them than we need ...

Anton: There are about a million of them.

Sveta! There are so many Chechens in Moscow, will they let someone deport their people from their homeland? No, it's absurd.

Ira: They are already living here.

Katya: They control all banks in Russia, these Chechens.

Anton: The entire Caucasus lives mainly in Russia, in Moscow.

Katya: There are over a million Armenians.

Anton: They have their own schools and everything (DFG, Moscow).

It should be noted that discussion about the situation in Chechnya gradually develops – without any leading questions from the moderator - into a discussion of the Caucasian expansion into large Russian cities, during which respondents demonstrate their ethnic phobias. However, the idea that the Chechen diaspora in Moscow and Russia in general is so influential as to be able to limit the freedom of the Russian authorities was voiced for the firsts time. And it was not voiced as a hypothesis, but in a confident manner.

One could disregard this episode. However, considering the tendency of the Russian mass consciousness to conspirological interpretations of the events taking place in world politics and the popularity of ethnic phobias in today's Russia, we can rule out that the hypothesis tying the absence of clear indications of normalization of the situation in Chechnya with the scams of «the fifth column» may become popular.

In any case, it is obvious that the mass consciousness has a broad arsenal of rational interpretative schemes that relate to the version that the Russian authorities cannot normalize the situation, although they want to do so. As to the opposite version – that the authorities «can, but do not want» to normalize it – which, as we have seen, is somewhat more popular with the respondents, there is no such diversity of arguments here. Actually, group discussion participants do not give a single reason to support the contention that the Russian authorities do not want to normalize the situation in Chechnya, except for the assumption about the economic background of the conflict.

Ira: On the other hand, it is probably to somebody' benefit that there is a war going on in Chechnya. A lot of funds are allocated for it.

Yura: A lot of money is involved there.

Ira: No one is getting anything, money is being allocated, but where is it? The economic situation there is not getting any better (DFG, Voronezh).

Money laundering (DFG, Voronezh).

Sergei: It means it benefits somebody. War is the most profitable business.

Anatoly: There is money there, and a lot of it.

Svetlana: There is oil there.

Anatoly: There are also drugs (DFG, Voronezh).

Some respondents appear to be fully convinced that the developments in Chechnya are determined by the financial interests of some criminal forces:

They will fight as long as the concept of money exists. There are a lot of drugs coming from there (DFG, Voronezh).

This war will not end as long as the drug mafia flourishes (DFG, Voronezh).

Such confidence is apparently based on the widespread stereotype that all social and political processes and phenomena are eventually determined by somebody's interests. This stereotype is genetically connected with the extremely primitive version of the Marxist understanding of history which was cultivated in the Russian mass consciousness for many decades. According to this logic, the authorities' behavior should also be eventually interpreted as serving certain economic interests. And although none of the group discussion participants make any assumptions as to who exactly causes the conflict to last for economic reasons, it can be assumed that the respondents associate the anonymous, but powerful forces securing their financial interests by maintaining controlled instability and military action in Chechnya with the top administration of Russia.

However, the fact that a version about the Russian authorities' unwillingness to normalize the situation in Chechnya, which is actually not backed by any rational interpretative schemes, is more widespread in the Russian mass consciousness than the version about their inability to do it is shocking. Obviously, its popularity is determined by ordinary people's endless bewilderment by the fact that a vast country, which until recently has been a superpower, cannot suppress armed groups on a such a small territory.

I am amazed how we, with all our potential, can have a war with Chechnya for so many years! (DFG, Moscow).

Yura: In WW II the front lay from the North to the South. And now we have such a thing.

Ira: We defeated the Germans and now we can't defeat a small group of rebels (DFG, Moscow).

This bewilderment in many cases outweighs the rational ideas of objective problems that prevent successful settlement and the mistakes and crimes committed during the military action in Chechnya, which make it less effective, but in no way indicate that it is being dragged out intentionally. This reflects the aforementioned tendency of the Russian mass consciousness towards conspirological interpretations of social reality, to looking for «the saboteurs», as a result of which respondents reach the conclusion that the authorities do not want to normalize the situation in Chechnya.

By the way, the regional elite, who are by definition inclined to perceive the reality in a more rational way, respond to the question about the intentions and potential of the Russian authorities to settle the situation in Chechnya differently from ordinary people. The overwhelming majority of the experts polled believe that the authorities «want, but cannot» normalize the situation, while one out of six of them believe that the authorities «can, but do not want» to do it. Practically the same percentage of the experts surveyed believe the authorities both can and want to do it and one out of ten believes they cannot and do not want to do it. The Regional elite are more pessimistic in their forecasts about the prospects of the situation in Chechnya than ordinary people: three out of four experts believe that Russia will not be able to resolve the situation in the near future and less than one-fourth of the experts have the opposite opinion.

Going back to the results of the mass poll, we should note that the respondents' ideas of the authorities' intentions have a considerable effect on their attitude to what the Russian military are practically doing in Chechnya. Those who believe the authorities genuinely «want, but cannot normalize the situation» are more inclined to approve of the actions by the military, while those who believe that the authorities «can, but do not want» to normalize the situation are much more inclined to disapprove of these actions.

Question: «Do you personally approve of the actions by the Russian military in Chechnya, or not?»

	Russians in General	The Authorities' Ability and Willingness to Normalize the Situation in Chechnya
	Russians in General	They can and want to do it	They want to do it, but can't	They can do it, but don't want to	They don't want to do it and can't do it	Undecided
Yes	36	67	46	29	15	27
No	42	19	32	55	64	25
Undecided	21	14	22	16	21	48

It should be noted that the Russians are not assessing the military's actions solely based on their ideas of the intentions and potential of the authorities. If 19% of the respondents, who believe that the authorities can and want to normalize the situation, disapprove of the military's actions, this most likely means that they blame the military for the current state of affairs in the region. On the other hand if 15% of the respondents, who believe that the authorities cannot and do not want to solve this problem, approve of the actions by the military, they are apparently convinced that the latter are fulfilling their duties well and it is not that the problem has still not been resolved.

Nonetheless, there is clear correlation between the respondents' ideas of the authorities intentions and potential and their judgements about the military's actions, which means that the people of Russia tend to believe that the inability to solve the problem of Chechnya is more forgivable than the unwillingness to solve it.

In general, the correlation between those who approve and disapprove of the actions by the military in Chechnya has been stable for about a year (36% approve and 42% disapprove). Regional elite is more positive about the military's actions: two out of three experts said they approve of them and less than one-fourth said they disapprove.

It should be emphasized that the majority of the experts surveyed seriously err on the level of the Russians people's support of the military in Chechnya (and consequently of the Russian administration's policy towards Chechnya). Over three-fourths of the experts are convinced that the percentage of the people who support these actions exceeds 40%, and two out of five even said it exceeds 60%, while the actual level of support is only 36%. Two out of three experts said the percentage of Russians disapproving of these actions is lower than 30%, while it actually is 42%. Thus, it would not be an exaggeration to say that regional elites are unaware of the changes in the ordinary people's perception of the military action in Chechnya and are basically basing their ideas on the illusion that the level of support of the military remains the same as it was some two years ago, in spring and summer 2000.

In response to a question about their attitude towards the actions by Russian military in Chechnya, some mass poll participants give their opinion of the military operation as such, approving or disapproving of the way it is being conducted, while others evaluate the way the defense and security structures are carrying out this operation. In other words, some respondents speak about what the federals are doing there, while others speak about how they are doing it. Therefore, the distribution of responses to this question cannot be construed as an indicator of the Russians' attitude towards the authorities' policy towards Chechnya, as an indicator reflecting their ideas of the methods used by the military, or the level of their professionalism.

However, the respondents' responses to open-ended questions as to what exactly they approve of or disapprove of in the Russian military's actions (The first question was asked only of those who gave a positive assessment of the actions, and the second question was asked on those who assessed them negatively. ), make it possible to say respondents who agree with the goals of the military operation tend to approve of them, while those who are dissatisfied with the way the operation is being conducted tend to disapprove.

Over one-fourth of the respondents who answered the question as to why they approve the military's actions (9% of the total number of respondents surveyed) said they ensure law and order («they ensure observance of the law»; «they are bringing order there, but it comes at too high a price»; «they bring constitutional order»), 8% mentioned banditism and terrorism («they are fighting terrorism»; «anti-terrorist actions»; «one needs to combat extremism»), 2% said the military need to fulfil their duty («their commitment to their duty»; «they are fulfilling their duty, defending their country»), and another 2% mentioned defense of Russia's territorial integrity («Russia should not surrender its territories and not give them away»; «if they were not there, Russia would not exist»; «protection of the country's territorial integrity»), etc.

At the same time, those who said they disapprove of the military's actions have become much more specific about what they are unhappy with. They mostly mentioned the reality of the Chechen campaign and not the super-mission of the defense and security agencies. One out of three of these respondents (11% of the total number of respondents surveyed) spoke about war casualties («people are dying»; «the deaths of Russian soldiers»; «the killing of civilians»), 6% - the inefficiency of the defense and security structures («they have been in this war for many years and haven't been able to do anything»; «a senseless, lengthy war»), 3% - the interest of some forces in continuing this war («everything is being sold and bought for money, even human lives»; «they are laundering money»; «they are fighting over this oil, people are getting killed»). Two percent of the respondents accused the military of being to lenient («it is necessary to be more tough»; «the entire Chechnya should be destroyed, like it was done under Stalin» and another 2% said the military are too cruel and inclined to marauding («military are sometimes cruel to civilians»; «there are marauders»; «too aggressive»; «they are acting like occupants there»).

At the same time, 7% of the respondents said they oppose war as such («it's not good to have a war in the country»' «I am against ant war, no matter what kind of war it is»; «I don't approve of this war, this conflict should have been resolved differently») and 2% said Chechnya should be given independence and become separated from Russia («it's not our country, we have no business being there»; «Chechnya should be separated»; «Of Chechnya wants to, it can separate from Russia»; «I think the state borders should be changed»).

It should be noted that the percentage of respondents supporting the idea of «war until the end» is higher among those who approve of the Russian military's actions in Chechnya than among those who condemn these actions. The latter group of respondents tends to favor the idea of «negotiations with representatives of the opposing side» more than the former group does.

Question: «Do you think the Russian authorities should begin negotiations with representatives of the opposing side in Chechnya, or not?»

	Russians in General	Question: «Do you personally approve of the actions by the Russian military in Chechnya, or not?»
	Russians in General	I approve	I do not approve	Undecided
Yes	43	40	48	40
No	44	52	42	34
Undecided	13	8	10	26

It is pretty obvious that the idea of negotiations reflects not so much a scenario of a peace full solution to the Chechen problem, but the respondents' confidence of pointlessness of continuing the military operation and the desire to stop it, whatever the consequences. About 18 months ago (In January 2001) the Public Opinion Foundation began asking respondents this question, and the percentage of those who favor and oppose negotiations have been about the same (Only once, in September 2001, right after the Yew York attacks, those who opposed negotiations considerably outnumbered those who favored them.). It is another sign that the national consensus on the Chechen issue, which emerged in 1999, has eroded away, although the process was not duly noticed and interpreted by regional elite.

Probably the most convincing proof that there is no unity and predominant idea of how the problem of Chechnya should be solved is the distribution of respondent's responses to an open-ended question as to what, in their opinion, should be done to normalize the situation in the region. Fifty-seven respondents responded to this question.

Almost a fourth of the respondents (24%) definitely support the escalation of violence and the use of tougher measures. Some of these respondents said that measures used against rebels and terrorists should be toughened, and many openly call for genocide against the Chechen people:

«Tougher measures»; «to be decisive and cruel»; «to kill all the bandits»; «Chechens should be killed, there should be a Stalin-like regime for them»; «to blow them up»; «to destroy the entire Chechnya»; «to put them in trains and take them to Kolyma»; «to take them out of Chechnya, to Siberia»; «everything should be encircled with wire and the Chechnya should be bombed»; «bury them under asphalt»; «destroy their mountains, gorges, paths» (open-ended question).

At the same time, 20% of the respondents definitely oppose the military operation. Nine percent of them simply say it is necessary to withdraw troops from Chechnya («to withdraw troops»; «to leave Chechnya»; «to stop the war, not to send troops there»), 6% want this republic to become independent of Russia («give them independence»; «leave Chechnya»; «stop the war, not to send troops there»), and 5% favor open peace talks with the enemy («to begin civilized negotiations with the opposing side»; «to reach a peaceful agreement»; «to begin negotiating»).

The respondents also named other ways of normalizing the situation: it is necessary to improve the economic situation in Chechnya and take care of the local population (3%), to replace the administration in Chechnya and at the federal level to fight corruption (3%), to establish strict control over the financial flows coming into Chechnya (3%).

However, the information given above clearly shows that the people of Russia, who vary greatly in their views of the possible ways of resolving the problem of Chechnya, are mostly pessimistic about both the current situation there and chances of any quick changes in it.

POF database > Алфавитный перечень категорий > I > Islam > Chechen Labyrinth